I have recently finally got round to reading some of Montaigne, an ambition which I have rarely had, but which, at the moment that I have had it, has appeared to me so necessary as to defer to much later, and which, at that later, still appeared frustratingly impossible. In any case, I have followed that which Will Self recommends as reading technique for Montaigne, namely, to start at the smallest
essais and progress to the
Apologie de Raimond Sebond, picking up and leaving off in the same way Montaigne picks up and leaves off his tract.
An interesting observation Will made was that many seek to compare Montaigne's technique with modern blog writing. It would be nice to think that in doing this I am somehow matching up to the project Montaigne embarked on, to paint himself entirely and naively, and in doing so to found - perhaps unintentionally - a new way of understanding the human race, and the individual: a notion which, according to the episode on In Our Time, was 'intensified' in the Early Modern period. Having watched his debate with Slavoj Žižek, whose concluding remark was that we are on the verge of the time when a new way of understanding the human will prevail. 'We' may be some of the last humans not to have our brains substantially connected to the Internet ether.
Unlike Montaigne, however, in his round Bordelaise tower, I am not so tough of stomach as to be able to present myself in an unbiased way. I am still a creature of great pride, and have many a great weakness I am unwilling to admit. Nor am I allowed free composition, uninterrupted by worldly cares. Admittedly, this is of my own fault, since, as I am writing this, The Last Leg bubbles away in the background, bringing an occasional distraction and resetting my train of thought to its original terminus.
So, then, as I look at my title again, I can conclude modestly that for at least one instant in the past, I believed that I was going to talk about 'Montaignian wisdom'. My studies today took me to consider the Apologie de Raimond Sebond, essay in which the essayist argues that nothing can be known for certain, owing to the fallibility of the senses. Pyrrhonist scepticism is discussed in the highest possible praise, its antiform to the liar's paradox, "Je doubte," applying both to the statement itself and to the 'outside' world. In a rare moment of believing the shadow of a shadow of flash of brilliance, I thought how this word-made-flesh might relate to Montaigne's comments on text-as-body and the theme of the mind-matter dichotomy. No clear conclusions yet; however, owing to this moment, I thought myself to have renewed confidence in my ability to write my second year abroad essay, which is silently (but not self-concealingly) overdue.
Bref, if I were to develop a craft as an essayist - subject si frivole et si vain - I would first need to establish some greater inner order. Lacking a clear focus beyond myself, my text has a tendency to cannibalise itself. What has now happened is that I am so tired of self-consumption that I necessarily need to find some being outside myself: an imagined reader other than my own conscience whom to address. In this regard, and aware that this tract may well be read by future employers, of whose judgment I ought not fear, for aspiration to unity of will, I will give you an example: I, in my mind, compared my use of bref to be somewhat akin to Boris' comment: Donnez-moi un break.
What is clear, I agree, though, with Boris, is that Something Must Be Done. Just, talking about Kermit the Frog at the UN assembly is maybe not the way. Or, perhaps, it is? Is he making us and world leaders aware of the very vanity of their discussions, not backed up by action?
"Il n'en est à l'avanture aucune plus expresse que d'en escrire si vainement. Ce que la divinité nous en a si divinement exprimé devroit estre soigneusement et continuellement medité par les gens d'entendement" (De la vanité)
To be clear, I have not read this essay, at least not in its entirety. I have always stopped at "vanity of vanities, all is vanity". These three-to-four lines are as much as I understand of De la vanité, as well as the following two, which are in Cave's How to Read Montaigne.
Regardless, in the end, the simple point of which I want to remind myself, and which may or may not be of any interest to whoever you are, reader, is that I found somewhat of a pleasure in reading the part of the Apologie de Raimond Sebond that I did: namely, the turn from skepticism to fideism explained through the grammatical tenses. In any case, I need to know about the Apologie for the exam, so any frustration I may have with it, I can console myself of with a realigning of my episteme towards What Is Good For Me. While this approach has hardly satisfied me in other texts (exception two: Voltaire's), I can at least stomach Montaigne without it. Does he construct a text which is alive in itself? Does his text, entire, match the speech-act-like self-evidence of the ἐποχή (epékhō)? Is this the way in which the Essais are a livre consubstantiel à son autheur? Certainly, Montaigne admires the way in which skepticism "presente l'homme nud et vuide, reconnaissant sa foiblesse naturelle". Certainly, Montaigne also prefigures his text as painting him tout entier et tout nud, that he is the very matiere of his book (hence the consubstantiality). Thus he himself is skepticism, and his book, and skepticism his book... Skepticism, then, perhaps, the third being in the Trinity, the Holy Spirit necessary to understanding the resemblance of fathers to their children (which is the subject of one essai in particular)... bref, the ability of the skeptics to produce a statement which also applies to itself is, for Montaigne... one and the same with the verisimiltude he aims for in his own portraiture.
And doubt is, no doubt, a compulsion to keep writing. For, as long as the author's mind is split in two, he will not stand up and get on with his life, but keep going, splitting himself between himself and the page, trying to balance the scales between how he perceives himself and how he perceives the text and how these two can dwell with each other consubstantially. If ἐποχή (epékhō) is written on the scales, it is because it is this principle which applies to the balancing of the authorial 'I' and the authentic 'I', a unifying principle once the split is made, or a splitting principle once a resolution of mind is taken to write on a particular topic. In any case, the exact way in which parts of the Trinity interact with each other has been a matter of monastic and scholastic debate since the church fathers, I conjecture.
I am not a literary theorist, but I am able to write and experience how it feels to write. From such, I can conjecture as to a theory of writing in the mind. Whether it is possible to do so at the time of writing, is another question. The only thing I might truly say when I write is that "I write." I may even be so vain as to conclude, "I write therefore I am." But if vanity were a profession, we have enough candidates for the job. Everyone knows cogito ergo sum. What is lacking in me is the personal insight to make any writing useful, as well as the ability to quote classical material; yet, I still have my childhood, I still have my memories, I still have my subjectivity. I still have something to give. I, moving, have nothing to say, which is why I convince myself so often that resting still at my desk is the best way to discipline myself. I have always been so, since school, and now, I am increasingly aware of the hydra-like nature of this essay, by which each sentence seems to reproduce three or four rather than come to a unitary, unifying conclusion:
"Swa swa mon on ealdspellum segð þæt an nædre wære þe hæfde nigan heafdu, and simle gif mon anra hwilc of aslog þonne weoxon þær siofon of þam anum heafde." (Old English Boethius)
"Qui ne voit que j'ay pris une route par laquelle, sans cesse et sans travail, j'iray autant qu'il y aura d'ancre et de papier au monde?" (De la vanité)
Is this not a warning? But what is the alternative?